The question of this seminar is whether anything meets the following description: “it is in itself nothing, except that it is linguistically MADE”. The description is due to G.E.M. Anscombe, who suggests that not only the basic elements of Recht and Moralität -- rights and promises -- but also the “normative” connections (or “rules”) constitutive of meaning are creations of certain linguistic practices. About these things, Anscombe is a “linguistic idealist”. But she knows that this is a difficult idea. If rights are merely a creation of certain linguistic practices, then there seems to be no objectivity to our talk of rights: “the question of the rights of man falls to the ground”. And it can seem that this problem spreads beyond Recht, not just to Moralität, but to meaning itself. If the “normative” connection that is fundamentally constitutive of meaning is truth, then it seems that truth is merely a creation of certain linguistic practices. But then how can the world of which these practices speak not have the very same status? Anscombe wants to endorse only a partial linguistic idealism, which holds that rules, rights, and promises are “linguistically MADE”, but does not hold that the same is true of the natural world. But does this make sense? In this seminar, we shall explore these issues by working through some of Anscombe’s most fascinating essays: “On the Source of the Authority of the State”, “On Promising and its Justice”, “Rules, Rights, and Promises”, and “The Question of Linguistic Idealism”.

All readings will be made available through Moodle.

Please note that Hausarbeiten can be written in English or in German.

Semester: WiSe 2025/26